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161Terrorism and a Civil Cause of Action: Boim, Ungar, and Joint Torts 
 




 A senseless act of terrorism violently and unexpectedly ended David Boim and 
Yaron Ungar’s lives.  While the thousands of American families have faced the loss of 
loved ones through the terror of September 11, 2001, both Boim and Ungar were dead 
long before that mournful day.  Now, as American families continue to recover from the 
tragedy of 9/11, David Boim’s parents and Yaron Ungar’s family have blazed a trail of 
civil anti-terrorism litigation that all terrorism victims’ parents, families, and spouses 
should adopt as their own. 
 The fight against terrorism at home and abroad has not been without controversy.  
The military conflict in Afghanistan has received a large amount of media attention – 
some questioning American tactics and offensives.2  The rights and trials of detained 
suspects have also presented controversy regarding the proper rights of the accused.3  
Similarly, the Patriot Act has raised several Constitutional and civil rights issues.4  The 
controversy surrounding anti-terrorism offensives is not limited to the criminal and 
military actions.  As Richard Milin observes, some victims of terrorism have filed 
controversial lawsuits against deep pockets – “airlines whose planes were hijacked, 
insurers, owners of bombed buildings, and even manufacturers of fertilizer that terrorists 
have used to make bombs.”5  These types of civil suits have “in effect, turn[ed] victims 
against other victims.”6  The Boims and Ungars, however, have set out upon a different 
course.  
While the fight against Al-Quida and similar terrorist groups has been left to the 
executive branch of the government and the military, private citizens, such as David 
Boim’s parents, have directly implicated in civil lawsuits in federal court certain United 
States organizations allegedly responsible for funding these organizations.  In response to 
violent and senseless acts of terror that have reached into the lives of peaceful civilians, 
the Boims and Ungars have taken up the fight against terrorism in civil court armed with 
two federal statutes which impose civil liability on countries and persons who provide 
material aid to acts of international terrorism. 
                                                
1 Juris Doctor, Ave Maria School of Law, expected May 2003; Bachelor of Arts, Franciscan University of 
Steubenville.  The author would like to thank his family for their support, Lisa Castorino for her patience, 
and Professors Mollie Murphy and Leo Clarke for their expertise. 
2 See Rae Vogler, Nothing Justifies Killing Innocents in War Against Terrorism, The Capital Times, 
November 17, 2001, at 11A; Peter R. Gathje, Mistakes and the Bombing of Afghanistan, The Commercial 
Appeal, October 28, 2001, at B4; and Jon Swain, B-52s Rain Hellfire on the Villagers of Kama Ado, 
Sunday Times – London, December 9, 2001, at 16. 
3 See Detroit Free Press, et al., v. Ashcroft, 303 F.3d 681 (6th Cir. 2002) and North Jersey Media Group, 
Inc., v. Ashcroft, 308 F.3d 198 (3rd Cir. 2002). 
4 See generally David Cole, Enemy Aliens and American Freedoms: Experience Teaches us That Whatever 
the Threat, Certain Principles are Sacrosanct, Nation, September 23, 2002 at 20. 
5 Richard K. Milin, Suing Terrorist and Their Private and State Supporters, New York Law Journal, 
October 29, 2001, at s1. 
6 Id. 
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This fight against terrorism in the civil courts, though not as publicized as the 
previous controversies, has also presented several difficult and previously untested 
questions of constitutional law and statutory construction.  We see many of these novel 
issues encompassed in the recent Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals decision Boim v. 
Quranic Literacy Institute, et al.7 and Ungar v. Islamic Republic of Iran, et al.8 from the 
District Court for the District of Columbia.  Boim II addressed the previously untested 18 
U.S.C. § 2333, which grants a civil cause of action to United States nationals injured “by 
reason of an act of international terrorism.”  The Boims sued not only the gunmen 
responsible for their son’s assassination, but also included in their complaint American 
organizations accused of raising and laundering money to terrorist groups.  The Seventh 
Circuit, in a decision certain to have repercussions in the wake of 9/11, determined that: 
first, funding a terrorist group without knowledge and intent to further their illicit goals 
does not constitute an act of international terrorism; secondly, a violation of criminal anti-
terrorists provisions does constitute an act of international terrorism in respects to the 
civil anti-terrorism statute; third, aiding and abetting an act of terrorism is an act of 
international terrorism in respect to section 2333 and a viable cause of action; and, lastly, 
neither section 2333 or its criminal anti-terrorism counterpart violate the First 
Amendment freedom of association.9 
In Ungar, the court interpreted 28 U.S.C. § 1607(a)(7), which allows a United 
States national to sue a foreign state that provides material resources for an act of 
terrorism.  Ungar determined that a section 1607(a)(7) plaintiff must show that a foreign 
state had knowledge of the illicit activity, intended to further the activity, and that the 
foreign state’s material aid was the “but-for” cause of the illicit activity.10   
Much like the tide of an actual war, portions of the Boim II and Ungar holdings 
represent individual battles won by victims or defendants.  Because the various theories 
of joint torts and their elements of knowledge, agreement, aid, and causation are less than 
well-settled in traditional tort law, the battlefield in this war is mysterious and unknown 
to both parties, as well as the detached judge.  While it is too early in the conflict to 
declare a winner, the availability of joint torts in the context of section 2333 and 1607 
actions is a valuable weapon against terrorism in the hands of plaintiffs.  Boim and 
Ungar, however, have handicapped the effectiveness of these theories in their 
explanations and overbroad requirements to prove liability in the joint tort context.  
 This article will demonstrate that the Boim II decision, while a fundamentally 
sound first explanation of section 2333, has not properly reconciled the elements of a 
joint tort cause of action with the statutory language of section 2333.  In a similar fashion, 
this article will also discuss how Ungar incorrectly requires plaintiffs to show that a 
foreign countries material aid was the but-for cause of the illicit activity.  After 
explaining the legal fallacy in both decisions, this article will explain how courts should 
examine section 2333 and 1607 claims in the future and also analyze the joint tort 
theories likely to recover damages in a civil anti-terrorism action and the elements most 
                                                
7 291 F.3d 1000 (7th Cir. 2002) (hereinafter “Boim II”).  
8 211 F. Supp. 2d 91 (D.D.C. 2002). 
9 Boim II, 291 F.3d at 1028. 
10 Ungar, 211 F. Supp. 2d at 97-101. 
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difficult to prove.11  In doing so, this article will explicate the Boim and Ungar decisions 
in detail.  In addition, attention is given to the legislative history of the statutory authority 
for the two civil causes of action for terrorist activities, relevant Supreme Court authority, 
and the common law of joint torts, all of which play a vital role in the war against 
terrorism in the civil courts.  
Part I of this article examines the background of the Boim decision.  Section I.A. 
addresses the factual background leading up to the Boims’ lawsuit and section I.B.  
examines the procedural history and holdings leading up to the Seventh Circuit decision.  
Part II explains the various Boim holdings in detail, with subsections II.A., II.B., and II.C. 
individually examining the three questions certified for interlocutory appeal.  Part III 
focuses on the Ungar case.  Part II.A. provides the factual background to the lawsuit 
while section II.B. examines Ungar’s holding.  Part IV provides a critical analysis of both 
decisions in light of the relevant statutory language and joint tort law.  Part IV.A. focuses 
on the presence of a causation element in joint torts.  Part IV.B. examines the remaining 
elements of a particular variety of joint tort, civil conspiracy.  Part IV.C. considers 
another variety of joint tort, aiding and abetting liability and its respective elements.  
Lastly, part IV.D. focuses on the presence of an intent requirement in joint tort theory and 
the relevant First Amendment implications. 
 
I. Boim: Background 
 
I.A.  Facts 
 
[A]nother broken heart, another barrel of a gun…12 
  
Much like the victims of 9/11, terror struck David Boim in the midst of his normal 
routine.  A dual citizen of the United States and Israel, seventeen-year-old David was 
studying at a yeshiva in Israel in 1996.13  On May 13, 1996 , while standing at a bus stop 
near Beit El in the West Bank, David Boim was hit by bullets fired from a passing car.14  
He was pronounced dead within an hour of the shooting.15   
 His two attackers were eventually identified as Amjad Hinawi and Khalil Tawfiq 
Al-Sharif, members of the Palestinian militant organization known as Hamas.16  Hinawi 
and Al-Sharif were eventually apprehended by Palestinian authorities.17  While on release 
awaiting trial, Al-Sharif killed himself and five civilians and injured 192 other people in a 
                                                
11 Sources have cited a similar ideal as an end goal of the Boim litigation. “The plaintiffs have two goals.  
The more modest of them is simply to establish a precedent that any support for a designated terrorist 
organization makes a person legally liable for that group’s actions.” Daniel Pipes, A New Way to Fight 
Terrorism, The Jerusalem Post Newspaper: Online News From Israel (May 24, 2000), at 
http://www.jpost.com/Editions/2000/05/24/Opinion/Opinion.7178.html. 
12 Bob Dylan, Night After Night at http://bobdylan.com/songs/nightafternight.html. 




17 Id.  
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suicide bombing in Jerusalem on September 4, 1997.18  Hinawi was sentenced to ten 
years imprisonment for the Boim shooting.19 
 The Harakat Al-Muqawama Al-Islamiyya, or Hamas, was founded in 1987 to 
pursue the creation of an Islamic state.20  Hamas consists of a political branch and a 
military branch.21  Hamas seeks to attain its goal by acts of terrorism and violence on 
civilians.22  Like Al-Quida and other Middle East based terrorist organizations, Hamas 
allegedly has a global presence, with control centers, or cells, in the United States, Britain 
and several other European countries.23  Of key importance to the Boim’s lawsuit, they 
also claimed that Hamas control centers raise funds from sympathetic parties in different 
countries, then launder the money to operatives in the Middle East.24  Operatives in the 
Middle East, in turn, use the money to train terrorists, provide support for terrorists’ 
families and pay for weapons used in terrorist attacks.25   
 
I.B. Procedural History 
 
But the enemy I see wears a cloak of decency…26 
 
I.B.1. District Court Proceedings 
 
David Boim’s parents, pitted against the faceless enemy of Hamas that took the life of 
their son, assigned names and faces to those who would provide money to Hamas and 
included ten defendants in their civil suit in the Northern District of Illinois.27  Defendant 
Quaranic Literacy Institute (“QLI”) is a non-profit organization that translates and 
publishes sacred Islamic texts.28  The Boims accused QLI of raising and laundering 
                                                
18 Id. 
19 Id.  The Northern District of Illinois’s initial  opinion in the Boim litigation, Boim v. Quranic Literacy 
Ins., 127 F. Supp. 2d 1002, 1005 (N.D. Ill. 2001) (hereinafter Boim I) notes that Hinawi was granted leave 
from prison in the same month he was imprisoned.  Hinawi did not return to prison and was missing for 
several months.  The court also noted that the United States Ambassador to Israel reported that Hinawi was 
returned to prison in Palestine at the time of the district court’s opinion in 2001.  The Israel government’s 
request to transfer Hinawi to its control has not been met.  Id.   For an account of the Justice Department’s 
actions in the Boim murder, see Nathan Lewin, A Promise the U.S. Makes, But Does Not Keep, Washington 
Post, August 25, 2002, at B01.  Lewin served as the Boims’ counsel in both the civil case and criminal 
investigation.  Id. 
20 Ungar, 211 F. Supp. 2d at 94. 
21 Boim II, 291 F.3d at 1002. 
22 Id. 
23 Id.  See also Don Van Natta Jr., Arrests in U.S. Break Terrorist Network Units, Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, 
October 15, 2001, at A5. 
24 Boim II, 291 F.3d at 1002.  The defendant’s appeal in Boim II comes from an interlocutory appeal after 
the denial of a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.  Id. 
For the purposes of ruling on this motion, the court “accept[s] all factual allegations in the complaint and 
draw[s] all reasonable inferences from those facts in favor of the Boims, the plaintiffs here.” Id. at 1008 
(internal citation omitted).  For this reason, any allegations regarding the liability of the defendants in the 
Boim litigation remain unproven allegations, taken as true only for the purposes of ruling on the motion to 
dismiss. 
25 Boim I, 127 F. Supp. 2d at 1005, 1010; Boim II, 291 F.3d at 1003-04. 
26 Bob Dylan, Slow Train in Slow Train Coming (Columbia Records, 1979) (33 rpm L.P. recording) 
27 Boim I, 127 F. Supp. 2d at 1006-08.   
28 Id. at 1006. 
 5 
money for Hamas.29  Also named in the lawsuit was the Holy Land Relief Fund 
(“HLF”).30  HLF is a California corporation with offices in Illinois and Jerusalem.31  
Similar to QLI, HLF is organized as a non-profit charitable organization to fund and 
conduct humanitarian relief and development efforts.32  The Boims accused HLF of 
raising and channeling funds to finance Hamas terrorist agents in the Middle East.33   
Also named as defendants in the Boims’ lawsuit were individuals Mohammed Abdul 
Hamid Khalil Salah and Mousa Mohammed Abu Marzook.34  Additionally, American 
corporations Islamic Association for Palestine, American Middle Eastern League For 
Palestine, and United Association For Studies and Research were named defendants.35  
The Boims accused these corporations of channeling money to Hamas for illicit terrorist 
activities.36 
The Boims brought their lawsuit pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2333, which provides civil 
remedies for those injured “by reason of an act of international terrorism.”37  The Boims 
sought treble damages for their injuries and an injunction against all defendants to cease 
collecting and channeling money for Hamas.38  The essential theory of the Boims’ case 
was that, although Hinawi and Al-Sharif actually committed David Boim’s murder, these 
two were “aided, abetted, and financed by the other defendants named in th[e] 
complaint.”39   
All served defendants, with the exception of the United Association for Studies and 
Research, filed a motion to dismiss the complaint under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure.40  The moving defendants argued that “the federal statute that 
was invoked by the plaintiffs…does not render them [defendants] liable for the murder of 
an American citizen…unless they have participated directly in that murder.”41  The 
defendants first argued that funding alone did not constitute an act of terrorism under 
                                                
29 Id.  QLI’s formal links to Hamas are also discussed in United States v. One 1997 E35 Ford Van, 50 F.  
Supp. 2d 789 (N.D. Ill. 1999). 
30 Boim I, 127 F. Supp. 2d at 1007.  HLF’s formal links to Hamas are discussed in Holy Land Foundation 
for Relief and Development v. Ashcroft, 219 F. Supp. 2d 57 (D.D.C. 2002) (Challenging the government’s 
freeze of HLF funds after September 11, 2001). 
31 Boim I, 127 F. Supp. 2d at 1007. 
32 Id. 
33 Id. 
34 Id. at 1006-07.  Marzook and Salah’s formal links to Hamas had been established in Matter of 
Extradition of Marzook, 924 F. Supp. 565 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).  
35 Boim I, 127 F. Supp. 2d at 1007. 
36 Id.  Boim I also intricately illustrated how many named defendants were linked to each other in some 
manner or other.  Id. at 1008-09. 
37 18 U.S.C. § 2333 (1992).  What is currently codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2331 – 2339B was previously 
known as the “Antiterrorism Act of 1990.”  Congress, however, repealed the Antiterrorism Act of 1990 in 
its entirety in March 1991.  The Boim I court noted that the repealed sections were “essentially reenacted 
under a different title.”  Boim I, 127 F. Supp. 2d at 1004 n.1; see also Boim II, 291 F.3d at 1009 n.6 (noting 
that repealed provisions were re-enacted as part of the Federal Courts Administration Act of 1992, Pub.L. 
No. 102-572, 106 Stat. 4506 (1992)).  
38 Boim I, 127 F. Supp. 2d at 1010. 
39 Id. 
40 Id.  Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) provides: “The following defenses may at the option of the 
pleader be made by motion: … (6) failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.”  The moving 
defendants were so confident that the plaintiffs’ claim was frivolous that they accompanied their motion to 
dismiss with a Rule 11 motion for sanctions.  Boim I, 127 F. Supp. 2d at 1011 n.6. 
41 Id. at 1010. 
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section 2331.42  Secondly, the defendants noted that since the Boims’ complaint only 
accused the defendants of “aid[ing] and abett[ing] acts of international terrorism,” and 
that since the plain language of section 2333 does not specifically mention civil liability 
for such a cause of action, the Boims’ suit fails.43 
For reasons more thoroughly explained in section II of this article,44 Boim I found 
that: first, funding a terrorist group, simpliciter, without knowledge or participation in the 
eventual violent act, does not rise to the level of an act of “international terrorism” or an 
“activity involving violent acts dangerous to human life” under section 2331.45  This 
would prove only a phyrric victory for the defendants, however, as Boim I went on to 
hold that sections 2339A and 2339B prohibiting “material support to terrorists” would 
allow a civil cause of action under section 2333 for funding, provided the elements of 
knowledge and intent are also met.46  Likewise, for any funding that took place before the 
effective date of sections 2339A and 2339B,47 the Boims could proceed on the theory that 
the defendants aided and abetted an act of international terrorism consistent with the 
language of section 2331, which defines acts of international terrorism.48  Lastly, Boim I 
held that imposing liability for providing material support or aiding and abetting an act of 
international terrorism does not run afoul of the freedom of association guaranteed by the 
First Amendment.49  In the end, the Boims had pleaded facts sufficient to satisfy a cause 
of action for providing material aid or aiding and abetting and act of international 
terrorism.  To that end, the defendants’ 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss and Rule 11 motion 
for sanctions were denied.50 
 
I.B.2.  Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals 
 
 Because the Northern District of Illinois’ denial of the 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss 
was neither a final decision immediately appealable under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 or subject to 
                                                
42 Id. at 1011. 
43 Id. 
44 Though section II discusses the reasoning of the Seventh Circuit in Boim II, that decision affirms the 
district court in most regards.  Any divergences from the district court opinion are also noted in section II. 
45 Boim I, 127 F. Supp. 2d at 1012-15.  Elsewhere, Boim I used an alternative wording for this holding: 
“[A]llegations of contributions to foreign terrorists groups, without more direct dealing with the group, 
does not constitute an “activity involving violent acts or acts dangerous to human life.” Boim I, 127 F. 
Supp. 2d at 1015 (emphasis added). 
46 Id. at 1012-16. 
47 18 U.S.C. § 2339A (Providing material support to terrorists) was added in 1994, while 18 U.S.C.  
§ 2339B (Providing material support or resources to designated foreign terrorist organizations) was added 
in 1996. 
48 Boim I, 127 F. Supp. 2d at 1017-18.  Similar to proving civil liability for the criminal offense of 
providing material support to terrorists under sections 2339A and 2339B, the Boims must also prove the  
“knowledge and intent” elements of aiding and abetting and act of international terrorism in order to prove 
civil liability. Id. at 1018.  In addition, because the section 2339 and the criminal action of aiding and 
abetting requires “material” support, the element of a causal link to the terrorist act is also satisfied.  Id. at 
1019. 
49 Id. at 1020-21. 
50 Id. at 1021. 
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the Cohen collateral order doctrine,51 the district court certified three issues for 
interlocutory appeal to the Seventh Circuit pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b).52  
 
(1) Does funding, simpliciter, of an international terrorist organization 
constitute an act of terrorism under 18 U.S.C. § 2331? 
(2) Does 18 U.S.C. § 2333 incorporate the definitions of international 
terrorism found in 18 U.S.C. §§ 2339A and 2339B? 
(3) Does a civil cause of action lie under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2331 and 2333 for 
aiding and abetting international terrorism?53 
 
For reasons fully set forth in Section II of this article, the Seventh Circuit Court of 
Appeals, speaking through Judge Rovner, held: first, that funding alone is not sufficient 
to constitute an act of terrorism under 18 U.S.C. § 2331; second, funding that meets the 
definitions of criminal liability under section 2339B does create liability under section 
2333; and, third, funding that meets the definition of aiding and abetting an act of 
terrorism also creates liability under sections 2331 and 2333.54  In addition to answering 
these three certified questions, Boim II also agreed with the district court that civil 
liability for funding a foreign terrorist organization does not offend the First Amendment, 
provided plaintiffs have knowledge and intent to provide material support.55  In the end, 








                                                
51 For an explanation of the Cohen doctrine see Cherry v. University of Wisconsin System Bd. of Regents, 
265 F..3d 541, 546-47 (7th Cir. 2001). 
52 Boim v. Quaranic Literacy Institute, et al., Case No. 00-C-2905, Order (N.D. Ill. February 22, 2001).  
Interlocutory appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) is appropriate in the Seventh Circuit when: the appeal 
presents a question of law; it is controlling; it is contestable; its resolution will expedite the resolution of 
the litigation; and the petition to appeal is filed in the district court within a reasonable amount of time after 
entry of the order sought to be appealed.  Ahrenholtz v. Board of Trustees of the University of Illinois, 219 
F.3d 674, 675 (7th Cir. 2000). 
53 Boim II, 291 F.3d at 1007 (quoting Boim v. Quaranic Literacy Institute, et al., Case No. 00-C-2905, 
Order (N.D. Ill. February 22, 2001)).   
54 Boim II, 291 F.3d at 1028. 
55 Id. at 1021-27. 
56 Id. at 1028.  The opinion of the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals was released on June 5, 2002. Id. at 
1000. The HLF’s petition for rehearing en banc was denied on July 3, 2002.  Id.  On July 10, 2002, the 
HLF, represented by Akin, Gump of Washington D.C., filed a motion to stay the mandate order under 
Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 41(d)(2)(A).  Boim v. Quaranic Literacy Ins., et. al, 297 F.3d 542 (7th 
Cir. 2002) (hereinafter  “Boim III”).  Under rule 41(d)(2)(A), the court may stay a mandate order pending 
the filing of a petition for a writ of certiorari in the Supreme Court.  The moving party, however, “must 
show that the certiorari petition would present a substantial question and that there is good cause for a 
stay.” Fed.R. App. P. 41(d)(2)(A).  HLF’s attempt to show good cause was its failure to consult with its 
attorneys regarding whether or not to file a certiorari petition.  Id. at 543.  Judge Rovner flatly rejected the 
motion.  Id. at 544. 
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II. Boim II: Holding 
 
But if you want money for people with minds that hate…57 
       
 The Boim II panel58 was presented with an opportunity seldom met in our litigious 
culture – writing on a “tabula rasa” about the meaning and scope of federal statutes, 
which  will certainly grow in importance in a post-9/11 America.59  As noted previously, 
the Seventh Circuit answered three certified questions.  Each question relates to its 
companion questions and each answer builds in part on arguments and logic from other 
questions.  For the sake of clarity, this article will address each certified question in 
separate sections. 
  
II.A.  Question One 
 
The first question addressed was whether funding, simpliciter, of an international 
terrorist organization constitute an act of terrorism under 18 U.S.C. § 2331.60  Though 
section 2333 provided the actual basis for the Boims’ cause of action in federal court, its 
reference and incorporation of the statutory definition of international terrorism found in 
section 2331 necessitated the interpretation of both statutes.  Section 2333 provides, in 
relevant part: 
 
Any national of the United States injured in his or her person…by reason 
of an action of international terrorism…may sue therefore in any 
appropriate district court of the United States and shall recover threefold 
damages he or she sustains and the cost of the suit, including attorney’s 
fees.61     
 
The term “international terrorism” used in section 2333 is defined in section 2331:  
 
[A]ctivities that (A) involve violent acts or acts dangerous to human life 
that are a violation of the criminal laws of the United States or of any 
State, or that would be a criminal violation if committed within the 
jurisdiction of the United States of any State.62 
 
                                                
57 John Lennon and Paul McCartney, Revolution on The Beatles (White Album) (Parlophone 1968).     
58 The Boim II panel consisted of Seventh Circuit Judges Ilana Diamond Rovner, Diane Wood, and 
Terrance Evans. Boim II, 291 F.3d at 1001.  Judge Rovner authored the decision for the panel. Id.  Judge 
Rovner is Jewish immigrant from Latvia who fled the Nazis in 1939. Almanac of the Federal Judiciary, 
Volume 2, 28, 30 – Seventh Circuit (Aspen Law & Business 2002).  She is a member of the International 
Association of Jewish Lawyers and Jurists and the Chicago Attorney’s Council of Hadassah. Id.  Judge 
Rovner was also the Hebrew Immigrant Aid Society Honoree in 1996. Id.    
59 Boim II, 291 F.3d at 1009; see also Michael Higgins, Family Can Continue Suit in Hamas Case; Islamic 
Groups lose court ruling, Chicago Tribune, June 6, 2002, at 21 and Stephen Franklin & Laurie Cohen, 9/11 
Families Sue Chicago Foundation, Sudanese Royals, Chicago Tribune, August 16, 2002, at 1. 
60 Boim II, 291 F.3d at 1009. 
61 18 U.S.C. § 2333 (1992) (emphasis added). 
62 18 U.S.C. § 2331 (1992). 
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 Therefore, in order to implicate QLC and HLF in the act of terrorism, the Boims 
argued that a payment to a known terrorist group “involves violent acts or acts dangerous 
to human life” within the meaning of section 2331.63  As a starting premise, Boim II did 
not dispute that David Boim’s murder was a “violent act.”64  Boim II next found an 
inherent ambiguity in the language of the statute concerning whether a simple provision 
of funds to terrorist groups “involves” a violent act.65  Turning to the legislative history 
for guidance, Boim II determined that Congress intended sections 2331 and 2333 to: 
“codify general common law tort principles”66 while “reach[ing] beyond those persons 
who themselves commit the violent act that directly causes the injury.”67   
 While the statutory intent to reach persons beyond those who commit the violent 
act would favor the Boims’ theory of liability (that funding alone constitutes an act of 
terrorism), the statutory language and imported tort principles mandated a different 
reading.  Most problematic for the Boims’ theory of liability was the statutory language 
“by reason of… .”68  Boim II noted that such statutory language indicates a proximate 
cause requirement.69  Proximate cause would rest upon whether David Boim’s murder 
was a reasonably foreseeable consequence of the donation.70  The plaintiffs’ theory, 
conversely, would “hold the defendants liable for donating money with knowledge of the 
donee’s intended criminal use of the funds [and] would impose strict liability.”71  
Therefore, because the statute contemplates a showing of proximate cause, the Boims’ 
first theory of liability, that funding simpliciter constitutes an act of terrorism, was 
erroneous.72 
 Given the inherent tension between the intent to stop terrorism at all points along 
the causal chain and the imported common law tort elements, Boim II was careful to 
remark that this portion of the holding refers only to funding simpliciter, or funding a 
terrorist group without any knowledge or intent to further criminal acts.73  Liability for 
funding a terrorist organization with knowledge and intent to further its criminal actions 
is covered under question three, which discusses civil liability for aiding and abetting an 
act of international terrorism.74 
                                                
63 Id.; Boim II, 291 F.3d at 1009. 
64 Id. 
65 Id. at 1009-10.  Boim II cites the multiple definitions of the word “involve” in the Webster’s Dictionary 
for proof of this alleged ambiguity.  Id. at 1010. 
66 Id. (quoting 137th Cong. Rec. S4511-04 (April 16, 1991) and Antiterrorism Act of 1990, Hearing Before 
the Subcommittee on Courts and Administrative Practice of Committee on the Judiciary, United States 
Senate, 101st Cong., Second Session, July 25, 1990). 
67 Boim II, 291 F.3d at 1011. 
68 18 U.S.C. § 2333 (1992). 
69 Boim II, 291 F.3d at 1011-12 (quoting Holmes v. Security Investor Protection Corp., 503 U.S. 258, 265-
68 (1992) (interpreting “by reason of” language in RICO provision to require proximate causation)). 
70 Boim II, 291 F.3d at 1012. 
71 Id. 
72 Id. 
73 Id.  Boim II hints that if funding alone constitutes an act of international terrorism, then sections 2333 and 
2331 would be subject to First Amendment Constitutional infirmities. Id. at 1011; see also DeBartolo 
Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast Building & Constr. Trades Council, 484 U.S. 568, 575 (1988) (courts should 
construe statutes to avoid First Amendment problems.).  
74 Boim II, 291 F.3d at 1012, 1016-1021. 
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 This portion of Boim II’s holding is relatively non-controversial,75 though the 
district court and appellate court arrived at the same conclusion via a slightly different 
route.  In its analysis of whether ignorant funding, or funding simpliciter, constitutes an 
“act of terrorism” under section 2331, Boim I focused its attention on whether the party 
giving money to the terrorists had knowledge of the illicit activity and acted in 
furtherance of the illicit goal.76  Boim I appears to collapse these two elements into a 
standard of “direct dealing with the [terrorist] group.”77  While Boim II agreed that the 
statute requires some showing of “knowledge” and “intent to further…the criminal acts,” 
they indicate that the language “by reason of” in section 2333 also requires a showing of 
proximate cause.78  For Boim II, the elements of “knowledge” and “intent to further the 
criminal act” collapse into a proximate cause standard that rests on whether “murder was 
a reasonably foreseeable result of making a donation.”79  While this rationale clearly 
supports Boim II’s resolution of this issue, the elements of knowledge, intent, material 
aid, and proximate cause take on a greater importance in the examination of certified 
questions two and three, concerning secondary liability and aiding and abetting. 
   
     II.B.  Question Two 
 
 Certified question two concerned whether the criminal violation of knowingly 
providing material support to terrorists, codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2339A and 2339B, also 
constitutes a civil cause of action under section 2333.80  Section 2339A prohibits the 
provision of material support to terrorists.81  Material support, in turn, is defined as: 
  
[C]urrency or other financial securities, financial services, lodging, 
training, safehouses, false documentation or identification, 
communications equipment, facilities, weapons, lethal substances, 
explosives, personnel, transportation, and other physical assets, except 
medicine or religious materials.82 
 
Section 2339B, passed in 1996, extends criminal liability to those providing material 
support to foreign terrorists specifically. 
 
Whoever…knowingly provides material support or resources to a foreign 
terrorist organization, or attempts or conspires to do so, shall be fined 
under this title or imprisoned not more than 10 years, or both.83 
                                                
75 Based on the relationship between the civil and criminal anti-terrorism statutes, the Seventh Circuit 
requested a brief from the United States government on appeal.  Boim II, 291 F.3d at 1009 n.7.  The 
government agreed with the defendants that section 2331 and 2333 did not impose liability for funding 
simpliciter of a terrorist organization.  Id. at 1011.  
76 See Boim I, 127 F. Supp. 2d at 1014-15. 
77 Id. at 1015 
78 Boim II, 291 F.3d at 1011. 
79 Id. at 1012. 
80 Id. at 1012-13. 
81 Id. 
82 18 U.S.C. § 2339A(b) (1994). 
83 18 U.S.C. § 2339B (1996). 
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 Boim II observed that in enacting section 2339B, Congress “intended that the 
persons providing financial support to terrorist should also be held criminally liable for 
those violent acts.”84  In a similar way, the Congressional record for section 2333 
indicates that Congress intended “to cut off the flow of money in support of terrorism 
generally.”85  Noting that there is no “textual, structural, or logical justification for 
construing civil liability imposed by section 2333 more narrowly than the criminal 
provisions,” Boim II determined that a violation of criminal section 2339 would be 
sufficient to satisfy an act of international terrorism under sections 2331 and 2333.86  “[I]t 
would be counterintuitive to conclude that Congress imposed criminal liability in sections 
2339A and 2339B on those who financed terrorism, but did not intend to impose civil 
liability on those same persons through section 2333.”87  Bolstering this determination 
was the passage of 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(7) that strips sovereign immunity and attaches 
civil liability to countries that provide material support to terrorists.88 
 In construing what constitutes “material support” in sections 2339A and 2339B, 
Boim II corrected the district court’s reference to “substantial or considerable” support.89  
The statute defines material support as “currency or other financial securities, financial 
services…” but makes no mention as to the amount of support necessary.90  Indeed, Boim 
II observed that the statute contemplates the “type of aid provided rather than whether it 
is substantial or considerable.”91  Boim II also rectified the District Court’s mistake 
regarding the time frame in which sections 2339A and 2339B analyses are applicable.  
Boim I originally held that the prohibitions of sections 2339A and 2339B could not be 
used in a civil matter alleging material aid before the sections’ respective dates of 
effective passage.92  Boim II, however, noted that the effective dates of sections 2339A 
and 2339B passages are irrelevant because “we are using sections 2339A and 2339B not 
as independent sources of liability under section 2333, but to amplify what Congress 
meant by ‘international terrorism.’”93  “No timing problem arises because sections 2339A 
and 2339B merely elucidate conduct that was already prohibited by sections 2333.”94 
 Boim II’s interpretation of the relationship amongst sections 2331, 2333, 2339A 
and 2339B draws upon its holding in certified question one, though it also begins to 
reveal inconsistencies that will continue into question three.  In certified question one, 
Boim II held that plaintiffs were required to show that the contributing defendants had  
“knowledge” and “intent to further…criminal acts” before assessing liability under 
section 2333.  Section 2339B requires an element of “knowing[ ]” and “material 
support,”95 but does not require an “intent to further … criminal acts.”96  Despite this 
                                                
84 Boim II, 291 F.3d at 1014. 
85 Id. (quoting Sen. Rpt. 102-342 at 22 (July 27, 1992)). 
86 Id. at 1015. 
87 Id. 
88 Id. at 1015 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1607(a)(7)).  Section 1607 is discussed in section III of this article. 
89 Boim II, 291 F.3d at 1015. 
90 18 U.S.C. § 2339A(b) (1994). 
91 Boim II, 291 F.3d at 1015. 
92 Boim I, 127 F. Supp. 2d at 1016-17. 
93 Boim II, 291 F.3d at 1016. 
94 Id. 
95 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(a)(1) (1996). 
96 Boim II, 291 F.3d at 1016. 
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inconsistency, Boim II clearly held that “conduct that would give rise to criminal liability 
under section 2339B…meet[s] the definition of international terrorism as that term is 
used section 2333.”97   
 
II.C.  Question Three 
 
 The third and most difficult certified question concerned whether QLC and HLF 
could be held civilly liable under section 2333 for “aiding and abetting an act of 
international terrorism.”98  The civil cause of action for aiding and abetting and the 
statutory prohibitions governing the provision of material support found in sections 
2339A and 2339B both impose liability on those who do not commit the violent act itself, 
but fund and lend material support to such acts.99  Because much of the Boims’ complaint 
concerned support provided before the passage of sections 2339A and 2339B, the Boims 
were forced to rely on section 2333 alone and an aiding and abetting cause of action.  By 
the time Boim II reached this third certified question, it had already explained that 
“sections 2339A and 2339B merely elucidate[d] conduct that was already prohibited by 
section 2333.”100  Therefore, it was certain that Boim II would find that section 2333 
encompassed a cause of action for “aiding and abetting an act of terrorism,” which, 
essentially, was the common law counterpoint for the statutory prohibitions against 
providing material support to terrorists.101  
 Though Boim II had already provided a strong foundation to support its answer 
that section 2333 allows liability for aiding and abetting an act of terrorism, Boim II had 
yet to examine the 1994 Supreme Court case Central Bank of Denver N.A. v. First 
Interstate Bank of Denver.102  In Central Bank, the Supreme Court determined that 
section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 did not provide a civil cause of 
action for aiding and abetting securities violations.103  Using the language of the 
Securities Exchange Act as a starting point, Central Bank first recognized that a civil 
cause of action under section 10(b) is implied, not expressly granted.104  Secondly, 
Central Bank determined that the language “directly or indirectly” in the statute does not 
provide a cause of action for aiding and abetting a deceptive act: “[A]iding and abetting 
liability extends beyond persons who engage, even indirectly, in proscribed activity.”105   
 QLI and HLF utilized strong language from Central Bank regarding statutory 
interpretation of aiding and abetting liability:  
  
Congress knew how to impose aiding and abetting liability when it chose 
to do so.  If, as respondents seem to say, Congress intended to impose 
aiding and abetting liability, we presume it would have used the words 
                                                
97 Id. at 1028. 
98 Id. at 1016. 
99 See id. at 1015-21. 
100 Id. at 1016. 
101 See id. at 1015-21. 
102 511 U.S. 164 (1994). 
103 Id. at 177-78. 
104 Id. at 172. 
105 Id. at 176. 
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“aid” and “abet” in the statutory text.  But it did not.106… Thus, when 
Congress enacts a statute under which a person may sue and recover 
damages from a private defendant for the defendant’s violation of some 
statutory norm, there is no general presumption that the plaintiff may also 
sue aiders and abettors.107 
  
Based on this language from Central Bank, Boim II was presented with two 
options: distinguish and limit the holding of Central Bank to the narrow factual scenario 
of the case; or presume that sections 2331 and 2333 do not allow a cause of action for 
civil aiding and abetting because the exact words are not found in the statute.  Boim II 
chose the former, distinguishing Central Bank on four grounds.108 
 First, Boim II argued that Central Bank addressed aiding and abetting liability for 
a 10(b) implied right of action, as opposed to the express cause of action granted in 
section 2333.109  This distinction was important for Boim II because, in order to find a 
cause of action for aiding and abetting an act of securities fraud, Central Bank would 
have been required to “pile inference upon inference in determining Congressional 
intent.”110  However, in section 2333, with its express cause of action for those injured by 
an act of terrorism, “Congress’ intent is clear from the language and structure of the 
statute itself as well as from the legislative history”111 – no inference piling was 
necessary.   
 The second distinguishing factor is “that the language and legislative history of 
section 2333 evidence an intent to import general tort law principles into the statute, a 
factor glaringly absent from section 10(b).”112  This distinguishing factor relied heavily 
on Boim II’s previous answer to certified question one, discussing the presence of 
traditional tort law elements in section 2333.113  In section 10(b), however, Congress has 
“manifest[ed] a deliberate choice to exclude aiding and abetting liability.”114  
 Boim II’s strongest argument distinguishing Central Bank was that “Congress also 
expressed an intent in section 2333 to make civil liability at least as extensive as criminal 
liability.”115  This argument derives its strength from the plain language of the statute.  
The language of section 2333 allows suit from any national “injured…by reason of an act 
of international terrorism.”116  Section 2331, in turn, defines “international terrorism” as 
“activities that involve violent acts or acts dangerous to human life that are a violation of 
the criminal laws of the United States.”117  Boim II noted that “activities that ‘involve’ 
violent acts, taken at face value would certainly cover aiding and abetting violent acts.”118  
Secondly, aiding and abetting a criminal act is also a violation of the criminal laws of the 
                                                
106 Id. at 176-77 (internal citations omitted).  
107 Id. at 182 (internal citation omitted) 
108 Boim II, 291 F.3d at 1019-21. 
109 Id. at 1019. 
110 Id.  
111 Id. 
112 Id. at 1020. 
113 See supra notes 60-79 
114 Boim II, 291 F.3d at 1020. 
115 Id. 
116 18 U.S.C. § 2333 (1992). 
117 18 U.S.C. § 2331(1)(A) (1992). 
118 Boim II, 291 F.3d at 1020. 
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United States.119  In sum, “[b]y incorporating violations of any criminal laws that involve 
violent acts or acts dangerous to human life, Congress was expressly including aiding and 
abetting to the extent that aiding and abetting ‘involves’ violence.”120 
 Lastly, Boim II distinguished Central Bank on the grounds that aiding and 
abetting liability is necessary in order to effectuate “Congress’ clearly expressed intent to 
cut off the flow of money to terrorists at every point along the causal chain of 
violence.”121  Though policy considerations were unnecessary to consider in light of plain 
language of section 2331, Boim II maintained that “the statute would have little effect if 
liability were limited to the persons who pull the trigger or plant the bomb.”122  
Therefore, the only way for the statute to have any teeth at all “is to impose liability on 
those who knowingly and intentionally supply the funds to the persons who commit the 
violent acts.”123 
   
III. Ungar and Section 1607(a)(7) 
 
Persecution, execution, governments out of control…124 
 
III.A.  Ungar: Facts 
 
 Yaron Ungar and his wife were killed in a terrorist machine gun attack on June 9, 
1996 near Beit Shemesh, Israel.125  Four of the five Palestinian men responsible for the 
murders were apprehended and confessed to the Ungars’ murders.126  The Ungars’ 
executor and family members sued, among others, the Islamic Republic of Iran, the 
Iranian Ministry of Information and Security, and three Iranian government officials.127  
The Ungars based jurisdiction over these defendants, as well as the defendants’ ultimate 
liability, on a 1996 amendment the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act.128 
 In 1996, as part of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act 
(“AEDPA”), Congress added an exception to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Acts 
(“FSIA”) to allow liability against a foreign state and individual officeholders for claims 
                                                
119 Id., (citing 18 U.S.C. § 2 (1948)). 
120 Boim II, 291 F.3d at 1020.  This justification for allowing aiding and abetting as a cause of action under 
section 2333 follows the form of the classical logical syllogism, with a major and minor premise followed 
by a conclusion. See Donald Kalish, Richard Montague, and Gary R. Mar, Logic: The Techniques of 
Formal Reasoning (HBJ College and School Division Publishing, 2nd edition, 1980).   
Major Premise:  Activities that involves violent acts under section 2331 are acts of terrorism 
under section 2333. 
 Minor Premise:   Aiding and abetting a violent act is an activity that involves violent acts under 
             section 2331. 
 Conclusion: Aiding and abetting a violent act is an act of terrorism under section 2333. 
121 Boim II, 291 F.3d at 1021. 
122 Id. 
123 Id. 
124 Bob Dylan, Trouble in Shot of Love (Columbia Records, 1981) (33 rpm L.R. recording). 
125 Ungar, 211 F. Supp. 2d at 92. 
126 Id. at 93. 
127 Id. 
128 Id.  The Ungars also brought a section 2333 civil claim.  Ungar v. Palestinian Authority, et al., 153 F. 
Supp. 2d 76 (D.R.I. 2001). 
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arising out of state sponsored terrorism.129  The amendment was also enacted 
retroactively, encompassing causes of action arising both before and after its passage.130  
If a state is not entitled to immunity due to sponsorship of terrorism and State Department 
designation as a sponsor of terrorism, it will be held liable “in the same manner and to the 
same extent as a private individual under like circumstances.”131  Eschewing a personal 
appearance in court, state sponsors of terrorism will often fail to appear, resulting in a 
request for a default judgment – a scenario that took place in Ungar.132  A default 
judgment may be granted, however, only if supported by “evidence satisfactory to the 
court.”133 
 
III.B.  Ungar: Holding 
 
 In assessing whether the Ungars had produced sufficient evidence for a default 
judgment against Iran for sponsorship of the Ungars’ assassination, the court struggled 
with the legal standard necessary to implicate a state sponsor of terrorism under section 
1605 of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act.134   
 Similar to the issues presented in the discussion of Boim II and section 2333, 
Ungar specifically noted the ambiguity in sections 1607 and 2339 regarding what causal 
nexus between the support of terrorism and the specific terrorist act is necessary to 
trigger, first, jurisdiction, and, second, liability.135  While a simple allegation that the 
country in question provided material support that caused the plaintiff’s injury is 
sufficient for jurisdiction under section 1607(a), liability depends on the elusive but-for 
causation.136  Ungar describes the standard that plaintiffs must satisfy: “Plaintiffs have 
established that Iran provided extensive support to HAMAS, but their proof does not link 
that support to the Ungar murders specifically.”137   
The language of section 1607 provides that a foreign state is not entitled to 
immunity from suit for “personal injury or death that was caused by … the provision of 
material support or resources” to a terrorist organization.138  With the statute’s causation 
requirement in mind, the Ungars proceeded on two causes of action in order to implicate 
Iran in the death of Yaron Ungar.  Like the Boims, the Ungars alleged that Iran aided and 
abetted the tortious conduct.139  Relying on Halberstam v. Welch,140 a case from the 
                                                
129 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(7) (1996 amendment). 
130 Ungar, 211 F. Supp. 2d at 91 n.3. 
131 28 U.S.C. § 1606 (1976), see also Ungar, 211 F. Supp. 2d at 91. 
132 Id. 
133 28 U.S.C. § 1608(e) (1976).  Ungar also construes what evidentiary standard must be present to “satisfy 
the court” pursuant to section 1608(e).  Ungar eventually settles on the standard for granting judgment as a 
matter of law under federal rule of civil procedure 50(a) – a legally sufficient basis for a reasonable jury to 
find for the plaintiff. Ungar, 211 F. Supp. 2d at 98. 
134 See id. at 98-101.  Hamas is no stranger to federal courts, as Ungar recognized, the factual links 
between Iran and Hamas have been noted in Weinstein v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 184 F. Supp. 2d 13 
(D.D.C. 2002); Mousa v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 238 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2001); and Eisenfield v. 
Islamic Republic of Iran, 172 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2000).  Ungar, 211 F. Supp. 2d at 91. 
135 Id. at 98-101. 
136 Id. at 98-99. 
137 Id. at 99 (emphasis added). 
138 28 U.S.C. § 1605(7) (1976). 
139 Ungar, 211 F. Supp. 2d at 99. 
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District of Columbia Circuit, Ungar construed civil aiding and abetting to require: a 
wrongful act causing an injury aided by the defendant; the defendant’s knowledge of the 
act at the time he or she provided the assistance; and substantial assistance in the 
wrongful act.141  Though Ungar devoted little discussion to the application of the 
elements, it appears that prong one is surely met by the murder of the Yaron Ungar.  
Prong two, essentially a knowledge element, appears to be met as well.  Iran’s formal 
links to the known terrorist group Hamas were well-established: “Here, plaintiffs have 
established that Iran provided extensive support to HAMAS… .”142  However, Ungar 
found a deficiency in prong three, the link to the wrongful act: “[t]heir proof does not link 
that support to the Ungar murders specifically.”143 
The Ungars also alleged that Iran and Hamas had engaged in a civil conspiracy to 
murder Yaron Ungar.  Again relying on Halberstam for the elements of this cause of 
action, Ungar required the following proof: 
 
(1) [A]n agreement between two or more persons; (2) to participate in an 
unlawful or tortious act; (3) an injury caused by an unlawful or tortious over 
act performed by one of the parties; (4) which was done pursuant to and in 
furtherance of the common scheme.144 
 
Because the civil conspiracy analysis does not require proof of “knowing and substantial 
assistance to a particular act,”145 it  appears that it would be easier for the  Ungars would 
be easier to produce sufficient evidence to satisfy the standard.  Ungar, however, held 
that there was insufficient evidence to establish any sort of “common and unlawful plan” 
between Iran, Hamas and the ultimate shooters.146  In so holding, the district court denied 
the plaintiffs’ motion for default judgment without prejudice, allowing them to renew 







                                                                                                                                            
140 705 F.2d 472 (D.C. Cir. 1983).  Halberstam’s explanation of civil aiding and abetting is explored fully 
in section IV of this article. 
141 211 F. Supp. 2d at 99. 
142 Id.  See also id. at 94-97.  
143 Id. at 99. 
144 Id. at 100 (citing Halberstam). 
145 Id. at 100 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
146 Id.  In so holding, the court focused its attention on the fact that the actual shooters were only loosely 
affiliated with Hamas and were not full-fledged members of the group.  Therefore, the court reasoned, it is 
unlikely that a mere henchman at the “end of a long chain conspiracy knew of the existence of the larger 
conspiracy.”  Id.  If the shooters were full-fledged, known members of Hamas, knowledge of Iranian 
support would surely have been more likely based upon the known link between the groups.  See Mousa, 
238 F. Supp. 2d at 11-12, and Eisenfield, 127 F. Supp. 2d at 7-9.  
147 211 F. Supp. 2d at 100.  Because of the novel nature of the questions presented concerning causation in 
the joint tort theories of liability, Ungar also indicated its willingness to certify a 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) 
interlocutory appeal. Id. at 100-01. 
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IV. Boim and Ungar: Their Inconsistencies and an Alternative 
Interpretation 
 
There’s too much confusion, I can’t get no relief…148 
 
Due in part, perhaps, to the phrasing of the questions certified for appeal, Boim II  
provides its analysis of the elements necessary to sustain a section 2333 civil cause of 
action in a piecemeal fashion.  This section will summarize the elements outlined above, 
identify certain inconsistencies in the reasoning and requirements of both Boim and 
Ungar, and also indicate, when applicable, arguments and interpretations to maximize a 
plaintiff’s likelihood of recovery in a section 2333 and 1607(a) actions against those who 
provide material aid to terrorists.  
 
IV.A.  Joint Tort Causation 
 
The first element that Boim II indicates must be satisfied in a section 2333 action 
is causation.149  Ungar also focused most of its attention of the factual and proximate 
cause requirements.150  In its answer to certified question one, Boim II indicates that the 
presence of the statutory language “by reason of” in section 2333 requires a plaintiff to 
show proximate causation.151  “The plaintiff’s must be able to show that murder was a 
reasonably foreseeable result of making a donation.”152  Boim II also cites Holmes v. 
Securities Investor Protection Corp.,153 for that proposition that the statutory language 
“by reason of” necessitates a proximate cause requirement.154  Holmes clearly interprets 
such statutory language to require not only a proximate cause, but also factual, or but-for 
causation, as well.155  This portion of the Boim holding creates potentially irresolvable 
tension with its holding in question three, which holds that aiding and abetting and other 
forms of secondary liability constitute an “act of terrorism.”156  In short, because the 
common forms of secondary liability do not necessarily require a traditional showing of 
but-for and legal causation related to the aider and abetter, the statutory requirement to 
prove causation exceeds what a plaintiff can practically accomplish in a litigation 
process.  
The seminal case regarding secondary liability and joint torts, Halberstam v. 
Welch,157 explains and distinguishes two of the most common forms: civil conspiracy and 
aiding and abetting: 
                                                
148 Bob Dylan, All Along the Watchtower in John Wesley Harding (Sony Records, 1967) (33 rpm L.P. 
recording). 
149 291 F.3d at 1011-12. 
150 211 F. Supp. 2d at 98-100. 
151 291 F.3d at 1012. 
152 Id.  
153 503 U.S. 258, 265-68 (1992). 
154 291 F.3d at 1011-12. 
155 503 U.S. at 268. 
156 291 F.3d at 1016-21. 
157 705 F.2d 472 (D.C. Cir. 1983).  The Halberstam panel is also noteworthy.  Judge Wald wrote the 
majority opinion for future Supreme Court Justice, then-Judge, Antonin Scalia and future Supreme Court 
nominee Judge Robert Bork.  
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Civil conspiracy includes: (1) an agreement between two or more persons; 
(2) to participate in an unlawful act; (3) an injury caused by an unlawful 
overt act performed by one of the parties to the agreement; (4) which overt 
act was done pursuant to and in furtherance of the common scheme… . 
 
Aiding-abetting includes the following elements: (1) the party whom the 
defendant aids must perform a wrongful act that causes an injury; (2) the 
defendant must be generally aware of his role as part of an overall illegal 
or tortious activity at the time that he provides the assistance; (3) the 
defendant must knowingly and substantially assist the principal 
violation.158 
 
These two theories of joint liability correspond to the first two subsections of 
section 876 in the Second Restatement of Torts.159  The Restatement includes a caveat 
which encapsulates the ambiguity regarding causation in secondary liability:  “The 
Institute takes no position on whether the rules stated in this Section are applicable when 
the conduct of either the actor or the other if free from intent to do harm or negligence but 
involves strict liability for the resulting harm.”160  While secondary liability clearly would 
require some sort damage resulting from an intentional injury161 or negligence,162 cases 
applying these legal theories163 and the Restatement examples164 clearly do not require 
both parties to be the factual and proximate cause of the resultant damage.  As one 
commentator has noted: “There is no requirement that [the join tortfeasor] be the ‘but for’ 
cause of the accident.”165  W. Page Keeton similarly commented regarding proximate 
                                                
158 Id. at 477.  For a recent Supreme Court treatment of civil conspiracy, see Beck v. Prupis, 529 U.S. 494 
(2000).  For a general history of the civil conspiracy cause of action, see Jerry Whitson, Student Author, 
Civil Conspiracy: A Substantive Tort?, 59 B.U. L. Rev. 921 (1979). 
159 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 876(a) & (b) (1977). 
160  Id. caveat. 
161 See, e.g., Rael v. Cadena, 604 P.2d 822, 822-23 (N.M. App. 1979) (verbal encouragement given during 
battery creates joint liability for the tort). 
162 See, e.g., Am. Fam. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Grim, 440 P.2d 621, 625-26 (Kan. 1968) (boy who broke into 
church was jointly liable when his co-conspirator set fire to the building).  
163 See Rael, 604 P.2d at 822-23, and Grim, 440 P.2d at 625-26.  See also Payton v. Abbott Labs, 512 F. 
Supp. 1031, 1035-37 (D. Mass. 1981) (joint theories of liability in Restatement (Second) of Torts § 876 
assess liability without traditional tort causation); Keel v. Hainline, 331 P.2d 397, 400 (Okla. 1958).  In  
Keel, the court held a defendant liable as an aider and abettor for a girl’s injury though the defendant was 
only handing erasers to other boys to throw across the room.  Keel explicitly rejected any cause in fact 
requirement, noting that it was immaterial whether the defendant aided the actual boy who threw the 
offending eraser because of the defendant’s overall participation in the general tortious activity.   
164 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 876 cmt. on clause (b), illus. 10: “A and B conspire to burglarize C’s 
safe. B, who is the active burglar, after entering the house and without A’s knowledge of his intention to do 
so, burns the house in order to conceal the burglary.  A is subject to liability to C, not only for the 
conversion of the contents of the safe but also for the destruction of the house.”  
165 John L. Diamond, Lawrence C. Levine & M. Stuart Madden, Understanding Torts 231 (LEXIS L. 
Publng 2000). 
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cause that “[I]t makes no difference that the damage inflicted by one tortfeasor exceeds 
what the other might reasonably have foreseen.”166    
In addition to the discrepancy in reconciling this causation requirement with the 
elements of traditional joint torts and secondary liability, the causation element Boim II  
and Ungar require would be difficult to prove.  American organizations that fund Hamas 
and other terrorist organizations do so in a covert fashion.  As Boim I explained the 
funding process: 
 
Hamas’ presence in the United States is significant but covert.  It conducts 
its affairs through a network of front organizations that ostensibly have 
religious and charitable purposes. …  These organizations’ purportedly 
humanitarian functions mask their mission of raising and funneling money 
and other resources to Hamas operatives to support their terrorist 
campaigns.167   
 
Boim II further explains the complicated process by which American organizations fund 
Hamas: 
 
The money flows through a series of complicated transactions, changing 
hands a number of times, and being commingled with funds from the front 
organizations’ legitimate charitable and business dealings.  The funds are 
laundered in a variety of ways, including through real estate deals and 
through Swiss bank accounts.168 
 
Both courts also noted that Hamas receives up to one-third of its multi-million dollar 
budget from overseas fund-raising.169  Practically speaking, it would be near impossible 
for a plaintiff to carry its burden of proving that a monetary contribution to an American 
charitable organization, after passing through several laundering channels to an overseas 
terrorist organization, was used to finance and, ultimately, cause the violent act that forms 
the basis of the plaintiff’s suit.  As Humanitarian Law Project v. Reno170, a case from the 
Ninth Circuit discussing section 2339, observed: “Once the support [to terrorism] is 
given, the donor has no control over how it is used.”171  In addition, sections 2339A and 
2339B, which provide criminal penalties for providing material support to terrorists, do 
not require that the aid be proximately related to a violent act.172 
                                                
166 W. Page Keeton, Prosser & Keeton, Torts 323 n.7 (5th ed., 1984) [hereinafter Keeton et al, Torts] (citing 
Thompson v. Johnson, 180 F.2d 431 (5th Cir. 1950)). 
167 127 F. Supp. 2d at 1005. 
168  291 F.3d at 1004. 
169 Boim I, 127 F. Supp. 2d at 1005; Boim II, 291 F.3d at 1003. 
170 205 F.3d 1130 (9th Cir. 2000), cert denied sub nom. Humanitarian Law Project v. Ashcroft, 532 U.S. 
904 (2001) and Ashcroft v. Humanitarian Law Project, 532 U.S. 904 (2001). 
171 Id. at 1134. 
172 18 U.S.C. §§ 2339A (1994) & 2339B (1996). 
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 It its discussion of the criminal section 2339B,173 Humanitarian Law Project 
argued that any showing of factual or proximate cause relating to a donation to overseas 
terrorism is practically impossible to prove.   
 
Congress explicitly incorporated a finding into the statute that “foreign 
organizations that engage in terrorist activity are so tainted by their 
criminal conduct that any contribution to such an organization facilitates 
that conduct.”  It follows that all material support given to such 
organization aids their unlawful goals…Therefore, when someone makes 
a donation to them, there is no way to tell how the donation is used…Even 
contributions earmarked for peaceful purposes can be used to give aid to 
the families of those killed while carrying out terrorist acts, thus making 
the decision to engage in terrorism more attractive.174 
 
 The legislative history of section 2333 also recognizes that the statute does not 
address a typical cause of action.  “Title X [section 2333] would allow the law to catch up 
with contemporary reality by providing victims of terrorism with a remedy for a wrong 
that, by its nature, falls outside the usual jurisdictional categories of wrongs that national 
legal systems have traditionally addressed.”175  Additionally, the legislative history 
indicates that this nontraditional cause of action should not necessarily require the 
traditional elements of factual and proximate causation.  “The imposition of liability at 
any point along the causal chain of terrorism…would interrupt, or at least imperil, the 
flow of money.”176  An imposition of liability “at any point along the causal chain” stands 
in stark contrast to the imposition of liability at only those points proximately related to, 
or the but-for cause of the act of terrorism as Boim II and Ungar require.  Likewise, the 
legislative history envisions that section 2333 would allow varied causes of action.   “The 
substance of such an action is not defined by statute because the fact patterns giving rise 
to such suits will be as varied and numerous as those found in the law of torts.”177  
Therefore, section 2333 could encompass causes of action such as a civil conspiracy and 
aiding and abetting, which, arguably, do not require such a showing of causation.178 
In order to rectify the inconsistency between Boim II and Ungar’s causation 
requirements and the lack thereof in joint tort theory, the “by reason of” language in 
section 2333, based on Supreme Court discussion of similar language in other federal 
statutes, may not require a rigid but-for factual causation and proximate causation in 
order to assess liability.  This solution would fully effectuate the purposes of the act as 
evidenced in the legislative history while remaining within the plain language of the 
statute.179   
                                                
173 According to Boim II, a violation of section 2339B also leads to civil liability under section 2333.  291 
F.3d at 1016.  Though Humanitarian Law Project discusses only section 2339B, its observations are 
relevant to a 2333 analysis as both sections prohibit the provision of material support to terrorism with 
corresponding criminal and civil penalties. 
174 205 F.3d at 1136 (citations and footnotes omitted) (emphasis added). 
175 Sen. Rpt. 102-342 at *22 (July 27, 1992). 
176 Id. (emphasis added). 
177 Id. at *45. 
178 See, e.g., cases cited supra nn. 161-63, 166. 
179 See Sen. Rpt. 102-342, at *22, *45. 
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In Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins,180 the Supreme Court addressed the standard of 
causation required by the words “because of” in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act.181  The 
Court noted that “[t]o construe the words ‘because of’ as colloquial shorthand for ‘but-for 
causation’… is to misunderstand them.”182  In the typical but-for inquiry, “ask whether, 
even if that factor had been absent, the even nevertheless would have transpired in the 
same way.”183  Price-Waterhouse alters this inquiry slightly: “the words ‘because of’ do 
no mean ‘solely because of.’”184  Therefore, in the context of Title VII, “[w]hen…an 
employer considers both gender and legitimate factors at the time of making a decision, 
that decision was ‘because of’ sex and the other, legitimate considerations… .”185  This 
approach is adaptable for analyzing the causation required by section 2333.  As a 
preliminary consideration, there is no difference in the meaning of “because of” as 
opposed to “by reason of” – both contemplate the same level of causation.186  Based on 
the Price Waterhouse analysis, “by reason of” does not mean “solely by reason of,” nor 
does it require a plaintiff to show traditional but-for causation.  Using the standard 
outlined in Price Waterhouse, if a plaintiff shows that terrorist organization that injured 
him was funded at least in some part by the defendant, then he succeeds in showing that 
he was injured “by reason of” the funding, though others may have also funded the act.      
Price Waterhouse illustrates this interpretation of the causation requirement with 
an example of a joint tort:   
 
Suppose two physical forces act upon and move an object, and suppose 
that either force acting alone would have moved the object.  As the dissent 
would have it, neither physical force was a ‘cause’ of the motion unless 
we can show that but for one or both of them, the object would not have 
moved; apparently both forces were simply ‘in the air’ unless we can 
identify at least one of them as a but-for  cause of the object’s movement.  
Events that are causally overdetermined, in other words, may not have any 
‘cause’ at all.  This cannot be so.187 
 
This example not only comports with the well-settled law of joint torts,188 but is also 
particuarly applicable to the complex funding of terrorist organizations.  As Boim II 
observed, foreign terrorist organizations receive up to one-third of their funding from 
overseas organizations.189  While this is a substantial amount, a full two-thirds is then 
obtained through other channels.  As Judge Kozinski wrote in Humanitarian Law 
                                                
180 490 U.S. 228 (1988). 
181 Id. at 279-82.  As noted in Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring, 527 U.S. 581, 626 (1999) (Thomas, J., 
dissenting), the statutory language “because of” means “by reason of.”   
182 490 U.S. at 240.  For a full explanation of the alternatives to but-for causation in the cause-in-fact 
inquiry, see David W. Robertson, The Common Sense of Cause in Fact, 75 Tex. L. Rev. 1765 (1997). 
183 490 U.S. at 240. 
184 Id. at 241. 
185 Id. 
186 Olmstead, 527 U.S. at 626 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
187 490 U.S. at 241. 
188 See text accompanying supra notes 161-66.    
189 291 F.3d at 1003. 
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Project, “terrorist organizations do not maintain open books”190 – there is no practical 
way to determine what exact source of funding was used on specific attacks.   
As the cited language indicates, it would be practically impossible to determine 
that any portion of the funding was the but-for cause of a terrorist attack.  Without 
adopting a Price Waterhouse fashioned causation analysis, no portion of aid could 
possibly be considered the but-for cause.  This incongruous result is clearly outside of 
Congress’ intent in enacting section 2333.  Indeed, in Congressional findings 
accompanying the passage of the criminal counterpart to section 2333, Congress found 
that “foreign organizations that engage in terrorist activity are so tainted by their criminal 
conduct that any contribution to such an organization facilitates that conduct.”191  A 
logical conclusion to such a finding eschews any proximate or factual cause requirement: 
“All material support given to such organizations aids their unlawful goals.”192 
 The requirement of proximate causation in joint torts is, at best, unsettled.193  
While the Restatement allows itself a caveat to account for this inconsistency,194 its 
examples and language allow credible arguments to be made in favor and against a 
proximate cause element.  The Restatement offers that “a person who encourages another 
to commit a tortious act may be responsible for other acts by the other”195 and provides 
an example in which a joint tortfeasor is liable for an act of which he is neither the factual 
or proximate cause.196  Immediately following this sentence and example, however, the 
Restatement states that “ordinarily [a joint tortfeasor] is not responsible for other 
acts…that were not foreseeable by him”197 and provides a corresponding example.198  
Other authorities also disagree.  For example, while Keeton writes that “it makes no 
difference that the damage inflicted by one tortfeasor exceeds what the other might 
reasonably have foreseen,”199 the seminal case regarding joint liability, Halberstam v. 
                                                
190 205 F.3d at 1136.  Nathan Lewin, lawyer for the Boims, similarly remarked: “One argument we made 
was that after Sept. 11, you can’t tell what is a benign use of funds.” Stephanie Francis Cahill, Hitting 
Terrorists In the Pocketbook, 24 ABA J. E-Report 5 (2002) (quoting Lewin). 
191 Pub. L. No. 104-132, § 301(a)(7), 110 Stat. 1214 (1996) (emphasis added). 
192 Humanitarian Law Project, 205 F.3d at 1136.  This argument roughly mirrors the substantial factor 
alternative to the traditional but-for cause-in-fact requirement.  See Robertson, supra note 182, at 1775-81. 
193 While there is no doubt that the alleged injury must be proximately caused by some action or 
negligence, the inconsistency regarding proximate causation in joint torts refers to whether the particular 
joint-tortfeasors action is the proximate cause of the injury as well.  See, e.g., Restatement (Second) of Torts 
caveat and accompanying text.  
194 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 876 caveat:  “The Institute takes no position on whether the rules stated 
in this Section are applicable when the conduct of either the act or the other is free from …negligence but 
involves strict liability for the resulting harm.” 
195 Id. at cmt. on clause (b). 
196 Id. at illus. 10.  “A and B conspire to burglarize C’s safe. B, who is the active burglar, after entering the 
house and without A’s knowledge of his intention to do so, burns the house in order to conceal the 
burglary.  A is subject to liability to C, not only for the conversion of the contents of the safe but also for 
the destruction of the house.” 
197 Id. at cmt. on clause (b). 
198 Id. at illus. 11:  “A supplies B with wire cutters to enable B to enter the land of C to recapture chattels 
belonging to B, who, as A knows, is not privileged to do this.  In the course of the trespass upon C’s land, 
B intentionally sets fire to C’s house.  A is not liable for the destruction of the house.” 
199 Keeton et al, supra note 166, at 323 n.7.  See also 74 Am. Jur. 2d Torts § 61 (2002) (“Generally, two or 
more persons engaged in a common enterprise are jointly liable for the wrongful acts committed in 
connection with the enterprise when the enterprise is an unlawful one, although the damage done was 
greater than was foreseen, the particular act done was not contemplated or intended by them all, or only one 
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Welch, explains that “a person who assists a tortious act may be liable for … reasonably 
foreseeable acts… .”200  
 Boim II, in an attempt to resolve this inconsistency, appears to stand for the 
proposition that if a terrorism funder has general knowledge of the illicit activity and 
provides assistance, then the illicit act is reasonably foreseeable and causation element 
(related to the specific aid as opposed to the tort itself) is satisfied.  The terrorist act itself 
(e.g. bombing, assassination), of course, must still be the proximate and factual cause of 
the injury, a fact presupposed in Boim II and this article as well.  While Boim II and 
Ungar were correct to require some form of “connectivity” between the act of aiding and 
the eventual tort, joint theories of liability provide such a connection, albeit in a more 
attenuated fashion.  The common sense justification for this relatively lax causal nexus is 
clear:  when one joins a tortious act in an unrestricted fashion they are essentially 
demonstrating their intent to further tortious activity and should be held liable for the 
injuries of the tort.  Indeed, money freely flowing to a known terrorist organization, such 
as Hamas or Al-Quida, creates countless foreseeable risks and an extremely broad class 
of potential injuries.  In order to fully effectuate the purposes of the statutes, courts 
should construe the foreseeable risks and injuries broadly.  As demonstrated below, a 
general knowledge that the joint tortfeasor will engage in some illegal activity is a 
necessary, but also a sufficient element to impute the remaining joint tort elements. 
The requirement of a knowledge element is well-settled in joint tort law.201  Though 
some quantum of knowledge is necessary to succeed in both joint tort theories of civil 
conspiracy and aiding and abetting, Halberstam notes that “there is a qualitative 
difference between proving an agreement to participate in a tortious line of conduct, and 
proving knowing action that substantially aids tortious conduct.”202  Indeed, in examining 
the remaining elements necessary to prove secondary liability under section 2333 
(knowledge, material aid, intent) there are subtle differences in the elements of the two 
primary joint tort theories, civil conspiracy and aiding and abetting.  For that reason, they 
are examined separately. 
 
IV.B. Civil Conspiracy:  Agreement and Overt Act 
 
 As previously listed, the elements of a civil conspiracy include an agreement and 
an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy that produced an injury or damages.203  As 
opposed to aiding and abetting liability, “the element of agreement is a key distinguishing 
                                                                                                                                            
the participants’ acts causes the injury”); Payton v. Abbott Labs, 512 F. Supp. at 1035-37 (joint theories of 
liability outlined in Restatement (Second) of Torts § 876 is an example of tort liability without causation).  
200 705 F.2d at 484.  See also Restatement (Second) of Torts § 876 cmt. on clause (b); 4 Causes of Action 
2d 517 § 15 Proximate Cause (2003). 
201 See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 876 (“[O]ne is subject to liability if he does a tortious act in concert 
with the other…or knows that the other’s conduct constitutes a breach of duty.”); Halberstam, 705 F.2d at 
477 (“[T]he defendant must be generally aware of his role as part of an overall illegal or tortious activity at 
the time that he provides assistance.”).   
202 705 F.2d at 478 (emphasis in original).  Halberstam insinuates that an concerted activity that results in 
an intentional tort would satisfy both tests for liability, whereas the tort of negligence lends itself only to 
the aiding and abetting theory. 
203 Id. at 477. 
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factor for a civil conspiracy action.”204  The agreement need not be explicit or expressed 
in words, an agreement may be implied and understood to exist from the conduct itself.205   
The agreement alone does not lead to liability, however, without the performance of 
some underlying tortious act.206  Though Boim II discussed secondary liability solely in 
terms of aiding and abetting liability,207 the elements of civil conspiracy, as outlined 
above, appear to satisfy the knowledge requirement.  Simply stated, an express or tacit 
agreement to engage in an unlawful act (funding a terrorist attack) with an overt act done 
in furtherance of the conspiracy (the attack) satisfies both elements of the civil 
conspiracy.  While proving a tacit agreement to commit a terrorist attack may provide 
evidentiary challenges for plaintiffs, most civil conspiracy cases are proved by 
circumstantial evidence.  “Mutually supportive activity by parties in contact with one 
another over a long period suggests a common plan.”208   
While the knowledge element appears to be a straightforward requirement for 
liability in a civil conspiracy, its bearing and relation to foreseeability is more discrete.  
While an agreement to engage in some tortious act and an overt act in furtherance of the 
conspiracy is necessary, it is not necessary that the tortious action taken be the exact 
tortious action contemplated by the co-conspirator. Halberstam’s methodical explication 
of civil conspiracy precedent is particularly helpful in illustrating this distinction.209  For 
example, in Davidson v. Simmons,210 the defendant was held liable for his co-
conspirator’s battery on a police officer during a burglary because the battery was an 
action in furtherance of the conspiracy to commit burglary.  Davidson, in turn, cited Tabb 
v. Norred,211 which held a defendant liable for his co-conspirator’s shooting of a police 
officer during a burglary because the “shooting was an act which could reasonably have 
been anticipated when the conspiracy to commit burglary was executed.”212  Halberstam 
aptly summarizes this legal concept: 
 
As to the extent of liability, once the conspiracy has been formed, all its 
members are liable for injuries caused by acts pursuant to or in furtherance 
of the conspiracy.  A conspirator need not participate actively in or benefit 
from the wrongful action in order to be found liable.  He need not even 
have planned or known about the injurious action…so long as the purpose 
of the tortious action was to advance the overall object of the 
conspiracy.213        
                                                
204 Id.  
205 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 876 cmt. on clause (a).  
206 Halberstam, 705 F.2d at 479. 
207 291 F.3d at 1028.  
208 Halberstam, 705 F.2d at 481. 
209 Id. at 480-85. 
210 280 N.W.2d 645 (Neb. 1979). 
211 277 So.2d 223 (La. App. 1973).  A portion of the Tabb holding was subsequently superceded by a 
statutory amendment to the Louisiana Civil Code.  The proposition cited remains good law, however.  See 
Stephens v. Bail Enforcement of Louisiana, 690 S.2d 124, 129-30 (La. App. 1997). 
212 Davidson, 280 N.W.2d at 649 (discussing Tabb). 
213 705 F.2d at 481.  See also David Waksman, Student Author, Causation Concerns in Civil Conspiracy 
To Violate Rule 10b-5, 66 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1505, 1513-30 (1991).  Waskman criticizes the absence of 
causation in civil conspiracy and argues that a proximate causation element should be introduced into the 
civil conspiracy cause of action.  Waskman focuses his discussion of civil conspiracy in the area of 
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As a logical result of this holding, the defendant does not need to provide substantial aid 
in furtherance of the particular tort committed, provided the tort is within the overall 
scope of the conspiracy. 
 These distinctions have critical importance in the context of alleging secondary 
liability for funding a terrorist attack.  Presuming a plaintiff could properly prove a 
conspiracy to engage in a terrorist act through the long relationship of funding and 
contact between defendants, then the plaintiff need not prove that the exact funding was 
used in the particular terrorist attack that caused his injury.  Based on the law of civil 
conspiracy, an agreement to further a terrorist attack would not require evidence that the 
conspiracy planned or contemplated the specific attack that led to the injury.  Rather, any 
attack within the scope of the “overall object of the conspiracy” can lead to liability, 
hence, Ungar incorrectly required a heightened level of evidence and causation.  In short, 
if the object of the conspiracy is terrorist activity, then any terrorist attack committed 
would be in furtherance of that ultimate object.  It would not matter, for example, 
whether the funding party had particular knowledge or was the factual or proximate cause 
of David Boim’s murder or the 9/11 attacks.  This lesser standard is of particular aid to 
plaintiffs requesting a default judgment against a defendant.  Previously, the Ungar 
plaintiffs were in a catch-22 situation when they were required to produce evidence 
satisfactory to the court to prove that the defaulting defendants were linked to the  act that 
injured the plaintiff without the benefit of discovery.  Conversely, a civil conspiracy 
cause of action does not require substantial aid to a particularly contemplated tort.  
Provided the tort is within the scope of the agreement, this cause of action is the best 
possibility for relief against international funders of terrorist activities. 
 
IV.C.  Aiding and Abetting:  Knowledge and Substantial Aid 
   
 As stated, Boim II directs its attention solely to the joint tort of aiding and abetting 
a tortious act.  Boim II indicated that the elements necessary to sustain a cause of action 
for aiding and abetting an act of terrorism include: knowledge, substantial aid, and an 
intent to help the illegal activity succeed.214  As discussed in the context of the joint tort 
civil conspiracy, some quantum of knowledge about some illicit activity is necessary for 
the application of this tort.  Similar to the analysis of civil conspiracy, the element of 
knowledge in the aiding and abetting context is intimately tied into reasonable 
foreseeability and proximate causation.  Though there is a practical difference between 
knowledge of the illicit act and legal causation, cases applying aiding and abetting, 
including Boim II, insinuate that knowledge and material aid—even without legal cause 
per se—will suffice to assess liability.215 
                                                                                                                                            
securities violations.  Though the Supreme Court denied joint tort liability for 10b-5 violations in Central 
Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 164 (1994), Waskman’s thesis is equally 
applicable to cases applying civil conspiracy in other contexts, such as funding for a terrorist action. 
214 291 F.3d at 1020.  See also Halberstam, 705 F.3d at 477; Restatement (Second) of Torts § 876 (b) & 
cmt. on clause (b).  
215 Boim II, 291 F.3d at 1016-21; Halberstam, 705 F.2d at 487-89; Davidson, 280 N.W.2d at 808-10; Tabb, 
277 So.2d at 227-30; Am. Fam. Mu. Ins.Co., 440 P.2d at 625-26; Keel, 331 P.2d at 400-01; Thompson, 180 
F.2d at 433-34. 
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 It is easiest to describe the quantum of knowledge necessary to assess liability for 
aiding and abetting using case precedent as an illustrative guide.  The first principle 
gleaned is that ignorant assistance or aid, or assistance simpliciter, as Boim II phrased it, 
is insufficient for liability.216  For example, in Investors Research Corp. v. SEC,217 the 
District of Columbia Circuit vacated a district court’s finding of aiding and abetting 
liability against a broker for securities violations because the district court had made no 
finding regarding the broker’s “general awareness” of the illegal activity.218  Investors 
Research explained that “any [act of aiding and abetting] can be performed in complete 
good faith by an actor unaware that anything improper is occurring.  Where the activities 
of the alleged aider and abettor are in this respect innocent, it would be unjust to utilize 
secondary liability to impose punishment… .”219 
 On the other end of the knowledge continuum would be the instance in which an 
aider and abettor has knowledge of a specific illegal act and substantially assists that act, 
which is eventually carried out.  In this instance, liability clearly would be assessed.  The 
Restatement offers several examples of this scenario: “A, a policeman, advises other 
policemen to use illegal methods of coercion upon B.  A is subject to liability to B for 
batteries committed in accordance with the advice”.220  In a similar fashion, in Rael v. 
Cadena,221 the defendant gave verbal encouragement to an assailant during a battery—
thus, the Rael defendant knew of the illicit activity, gave encouragement to engage in that 
exact activity, and the encouraged activity occurred.222  Rael is also a fine example of 
how joint liability can attach without a finding of factual cause.  As Halberstam notes: 
“The court explained that liability did not require …that the injury had directly resulted 
from the encouragement.”223 
 While cases that fall neatly within these two extremes will yield a certain result, 
there is a third category of aiding and abetting knowledge in which most section 2333 
cases will lie.  The precise question is whether one may be liable as an aider and abettor 
if he has knowledge of some illegal activity, but had no knowledge of the exact activity 
that eventually occurred.  As Halberstam phrases this question: “When is a defendant 
liable for injuries caused by the acts of the person assisted when the acts were not 
specifically contemplated by the defendant at the time he offered aid?”224  In this difficult 
third category, the issue of reasonable foreseeability alluded to previously enters the 
analysis.  As outlined above, the concept of joint tort liability does not necessarily require 
the actions of both parties to be the factual and legal cause of the eventual injuries.  While 
the Restatement offers examples indicating that specific knowledge of the particular tort 
is not necessary for liability, provided there is general knowledge of illegal activity,225 it 
                                                
216 291 F.3d at 1009-12. 
217 628 F.2d 168 (D.C. Cir. 1980). 
218 Id. at 178. 
219 Id. at 178 n. 61. 
220 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 876 illus. on clause (b) 4-8. 
221 See Rael, 604 P.2d at 822-23. 
222 Id.  See also Russell v. Marboro Books, 183 N.Y.S.2d 8 (Sup.Ct. 1959) (aiding and abetting liability 
assessed when company sold model’s picture to a company knowing that the company would eventually 
defame the picture). 
223  705 F.2d at 481 (emphasis in original) (discussing Rael). 
224 Id. at 483. 
225 Restatement (Seconod) of Torts § 876 cmt. on clause (b); illus. 10 on clause (b). 
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creates considerable tension by stating that an aider and abettor would not incur liability 
for acts “not foreseeable by him.”226  The Restatement in an effort, perhaps, to account 
for this tension, includes a caveat which lends credence to either interpretation.227  
Despite the Restatement’s ostensible schizophrenia concerning this question, it appears 
settled that a defendant need not have particular knowledge of the tort accomplished, 
provided that the defendant has general knowledge of tortious activity and the tortious act 
was a reasonably foreseeable event based upon that knowledge. 
 The fact pattern of Halberstam fittingly illustrates this subtle legal principal.  In 
Halberstam, the defendant’s live-in boyfriend engaged in a burglary enterprise for 
approximately four years.  During this time, the defendant had knowledge that her 
boyfriend was engaged in some sort of illegal theft activity and she also helped 
administrate the illicit business involved with selling the stolen items.  The boyfriend 
eventually killed one of his burglary victims and the defendant was sued for engaging in 
a civil conspiracy and aiding and abetting the  murder.  Halberstam affirmed the finding 
of the district court that “Hamilton knew about …Welsh’s illicit enterprise” and “had a 
general awareness of her role in a continuing criminal enterprise.”228   While Hamilton 
had no knowledge of the murder specifically, “it was enough that she knew he was 
involved in some type of personal property crime at night…because violence and killing 
is a foreseeable risk in any of these enterprises.”229  Similarly, in Thompson v. Johnson,230 
the court held the defendants liable for aiding and abetting an act of battery when they 
prevented others from stopping the attack.  Though the Thompson defendants claimed 
ignorance that the altercation would lead to serious bodily injury, the court held that “all 
are answerable for any injury done by any one of them, although the damage done was 
greater than was foreseen or the particular act done was not contemplated or intended by 
them.”231   
 In summary, the knowledge element of aiding and abetting liability under sections 
2333 and 1607 contains an element of foreseeability that provides enough leeway for 
plaintiffs to sue monetary contributors while still satisfying the elements of a section 
2333 action as outlined in Boim.232  Based upon the fact that certain groups have been 
                                                
226 Id. at cmt. on clause (b); illus. 11 on clause (b). 
227 Id. at caveat. 
228 Halberstam at 488; see also Investors Research, 628 F.2d at 176-79 (discussing the general awareness 
element in aiding and abetting liability). 
229 705 F.2d at 488. 
230 180 F.2d 431 (5th Cir. 1950) (applying Mississippi tort law). 
231 Id. at 434.  This language could be read to mean that an aider and abettor is liable even for acts that were 
not reasonably foreseeable result of the aid proffered.  For the purposes of this citation, however, it, at a 
minimum, stands for the proposition that an aider and abettor does not need particular knowledge of the 
eventual tortious act.  Similarly, in Keel, 331 P.2d at 400-01, the court held the defendant liable for the 
plaintiff’s loss of her eye due to the defendant’s handing an eraser to another student to throw across the 
room.  Though the defendant had no intent or prior knowledge that the girl was going to be hit by the 
eraser, the court implies that such an activity was reasonably foreseeable based on the defendant’s general 
knowledge of the tortious activity taking place.  
232 In Alan Bromberg & Lewis B. Lowenfels, Aiding and Abetting Securities Fraud: A Critical 
Examination, 52 Alb. L. Rev. 637, 668-727 (1988), the authors examine the joint tort of aiding and abetting 
in the securities domain.  Though the Supreme Court eventually held in Central Bank of Denver v. First 
Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 164 (1994), that rule 10b-5 does not provide a cause of action for 
aiding and abetting, Bromberg and Lowenfels’ examination of aiding and abetting liability as a cause of 
action is instructive.  The article actually argues that the “reasonably foreseeable” element of the cause of 
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designated international terrorist organizations by the Secretary of State,233 it is 
improbable that a defendant could claim that he was unaware of a certain organization’s 
involvement with acts of terrorism.  Likewise, based on the settled law of aiding and 
abetting liability, a defendant need not have particular knowledge of the exact terrorist 
attack in order to be held liable.  Rather, if a plaintiff can show that a defendant had 
general knowledge of the activities of the terrorist organization (and provided substantial 
aid, as discussed below), then the defendant should properly be held liable for every act 
of terrorism that was funded, or could have been funded, by their money – as any violent 
act was the reasonably foreseeable result of unchecked funding to an organization 
devoted to terrorism.234 
 The second element of an aiding and abetting cause of action is the requirement of 
“substantial aid.”235  Boim II imparted a key distinction and slight alteration to the 
traditional elements of aiding and abetting liability concerning what constitutes 
“substantial aid.”  This distinction is also applicable in assessing what constitutes 
material aid under section 1607.  The traditional inquiry regarding what constitutes 
substantial aid depended upon five basic factors: the nature of the act encouraged; the 
amount (and kind) of assistance given; the defendant’s absence or presence at the time of 
the tort; his relation to the tortious actor; and the defendant’s state of mind.236  Boim II, 
however, explicitly rejects the proposition that the aid offered the act in question must be 
substantial, as required by traditional aiding and abetting law.237  Rather, the language of 
the statute clearly contemplates “the type of aid provided rather than whether it is 
substantial or considerable….  Even small donations made knowingly and intentionally in 
support of terrorism may meet the standard for civil liability in section 2333.”238 
 While this portion of the holding certainly benefits plaintiffs in a section 2333 
(and section 1607) actions, funding a terrorist organization could also reach the level of 
substantial aid under the traditional elements outlined in the Restatement.  The first two 
factors, the nature of the act and amount and kind of assistance, are closely interrelated.  
Halberstam indicates that the inquiry should focus on how essential the aiding and 
abetting was to the ultimate tortious action.239  In executing a terrorist attack, funding 
plays an indispensable role.  As Boim II explained, the funding is necessary to finance 
                                                                                                                                            
action is rooted in the “substantial aid” element rather than the knowledge element, as this article argues.  
Their argument, however, is not applicable to a section 2333 violation because, as Boim II explains, the 
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training, weapons, lodging, explosives, personnel and compensation to the families of 
suicide terrorists.240  Considering the second inquiry (the amount and kind of assistance) 
in detail, the statute obviously places the kind or type of assistance above the amount.241  
Nonetheless, because terrorist organizations receive up to one-third of their budget from 
overseas fundraising,242 the amount of assistance is a substantial factor in the attacks.  
The third and fourth factors, the presence at the time of the tort and the relation to the 
tortfeasor, admittedly would not favor liability against an overseas funder.  The fifth 
factor in the inquiry regarding substantial aid assesses the state of mind of the aider and 
abettor.  This element corresponds directly to two other elements in the aiding and 
abetting context, knowledge and intent.  While knowledge of the tort in question has been 
addressed above, the intent element warrants further discussion. 
 The question of intent in the joint tort context shades into the analysis previously 
conducted concerning causation and knowledge.  As demonstrated above, while 
knowledge of some general illegal activity is necessary, liability for aiding and abetting 
may be assessed even without previous, particular knowledge of a specific tort.  In a 
similar fashion, a defendant may be liable for aiding and abetting an act even if the aid 
offered was not the factual or proximate cause of the act.  As a corollary to these 
principles, it follows that if a defendant can be held liable without specific knowledge of 
the act, which he is neither the factual or proximate cause of, then the aider and abettor 
can also be held liable without personally intending the tortious act.  While this 
formulation may appear to border on strict liability, the element of some  “general 
knowledge” of a criminal act and the provision of “aid” appears to suggest that the 
eventual tort was reasonably foreseeable and intended.243  The link between knowledge 
and intent in traditional tort theory is well established.  Indeed, the very definition of 
intent involves knowing with a substantial certainty that a tort will occur.244  Though 
“knowing with a substantial certainty” indicates a higher burden to met in cases involving 
an intentional tort, case law has applied more the “reasonably foreseeable” standard to 
intentional torts which exceed the specific knowledge of the aider and abettor.245   
 The ambiguities concerning causations, knowledge, and now, intent, in the joint 
tort theory may all be traced back to the Restatement Caveat and contradictory examples 
concerning joint tort liability for unforeseen, unknown, and unintended torts committed 
by a compatriot.246  Consistent with the formulation outlined in this article, joint tort case 
law has assessed liability to an aider and abettor by generally inferring, from the presence 
of knowledge, some general intent to further the tort committed.  For example, in 
Halberstam, though the defendant had no knowledge and evidenced no intent to aid and 
abet murder, she was found liable as an aider and abettor for her co-conspirator’s murder 
because “her continuous participation [in the burglary venture] reflected her intent and 
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desire to make the venture succeed.”247  Similarly, in American Family Mutual Insurance 
Company v. Grim, the court assessed liability against an aider and abettor who had no 
knowledge of the underlying tort (burning a building during a robbery).248  Grim, having 
acknowledged the defendant’s knowledge of the general burglary scheme, inferred the 
presence of intent: “it could be inferred that he [defendant] actively participated in the 
accomplishment of the overall mission … it would appear that he intended to reap the 
same benefits… .”249  Lastly, Thompson, discussed above in the context of knowledge 
and causation, also assessed liability on aiders and abettors for a battery that exceeded the 
intent of the defendants who offered the aid.250 
 Boim II created a further inconsistency regarding the intent requirement by 
holding that conduct which violates sections 2339A and 2339B creates liability under 
section 2333.251  Criminal sections 2339A and 2339B, however, do not contain any intent 
requirement.252  Nonetheless, Boim II appears to add an intent requirement in addition to 
the elements of section 2339 in order to assess civil liability.253  As demonstrated above, 
such a requirement was unnecessary to remain with the requirements of traditional joint 
tort liability and the statutory language of section 2333.  Boim II likely included the intent 
requirement in order to satisfy the defendants’ First Amendment challenges.  
  
IV.D.  Intent and The First Amendment 
 
 QLC and HLF raised two separate, but closely related First Amendment freedom 
of association challenges to imposing liability for their alleged provision of material 
support to Hamas.  First, they argued that the Boims sought to hold them liable for their 
mere association with Hamas, though they lacked any intent to further Hamas’ illicit 
goals.  Second, they argued that criminal section 2339B, which Boim II examined 
tangentially in relation to section 2333,254 failed First Amendment scrutiny for its failure 
to consider “the intent and associational rights of contributors who donate money for 
humanitarian purposes.”255 
 Boim II began its analysis with the well-established proposition that “in order to 
impose liability on an individual or association with a group, it is necessary to establish 
that the group possessed unlawful goals and that the individual held a specific intent to 
further those illegal aims.”256  Having already held that liability for aiding and abetting an 
act of terrorism under section 2333 required knowledge, intent, and material aid in 
furtherance of an illegal act, Boim II logically concluded that such a showing would also 
satisfy the First Amendment freedom to associate as construed in Claiborne Hardware.257  
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Any of Hamas’ alleged humanitarian efforts were also irrelevant for First Amendment 
purposes “if HLF and QLC knew about Hamas’ illegal operations, and intended to help 
Hamas accomplish those illegal goals when they contributed money to the 
organization.”258 
 The defendants also challenged the facial constitutionality of section 2339B, 
alleging that it “imposes liability without regard to the intent of the donor.” 259  Boim II 
first noted that the criminal prohibition of section 2339B was not directly implicated in 
the present civil litigation.260  The court reformulated the challenge in such a manner to 
provide the defendants with the proper standing to assert a challenge: whether a section 
2333 claim founded solely on conduct that would render a person criminally liable under 
section 2339B would violate the First Amendment.261  Relying on the reasoning of the 
Ninth Circuit in Humanitarian Law Project v. Reno,262 Boim II found section 2339B to 
pass First Amendment scrutiny.263 
 In conducting its analysis, Boim II first identified what section 2339B prohibits: 
the provision of material support.264  While Claiborne Hardware discussed liability 
stemming from association alone,265 section 2339B “does not implicate associational or 
speech rights.”266  Under both sections 2339 and 2333, anyone may join Hamas, “praise 
Hamas for its use of terrorism, and vigorously advocate the goals and philosophies of 
Hamas.  Section 2339B prohibits only the provision of material support (as the term is 
defined) to a terrorist organization.”267  While advocacy warrants a high level of scrutiny 
under the First Amendment,268 a donation of money only symbolically represents 
advocacy and may be limited by the government accordingly.269  Specifically, the 
constitutional standard for government regulation of monetary donations is whether the 
State “demonstrates a sufficiently important interest and employs means closely drawn to 
avoid unnecessary abridgement of associational freedoms.”270 
Applying this standard, Boim II found that the “government’s interest in 
preventing terrorism is not only important but paramount.”271  In so holding, Boim 
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II made its lone reference to the events of September 11, 2001, noting 
understatedly:  
“[T]hat interest has been made all the more imperative by the 
events of September 11, 2001… .”272  The court also held that 
section 2339B was narrowly tailored to avoid unnecessary 
abridgement of associational freedoms.  “Congress did not attach 
liability for simply joining a terrorist organization or zealously 
espousing its views.”273  Instead, “Congress carefully limited its 
prohibition on funding as narrowly as possible in order to achieve 
the government’s interest in preventing terrorism.”274 
 
 While Boim II did nothing more than affirm the basic reasoning of Humanitarian 
Law Project, the discussion was arguably unwarranted as the First Amendment 
challenges were not included in the questions certified for appeal.275  Additionally, the 
First Amendment argument the defendants posited claimed that secondary liability under 
section 2333 assessed liability without intent to further the organizations illegitimate 
aims.276  Because Boim II maintained that an aiding and abetting action required intent, 
there was no real need to engage in the analysis of Humanitarian Law Project outlined 
above.  As stated in the previous section, it appears that Boim II instead contemplated that 
the intent requirement could be imputed from a showing of a general awareness of the 
criminal activity and a provision of some aid.  This interpretation likely explains the 
presence of Humanitarian Law Project, as it clearly held that “the First Amendment does 
not require the government to demonstrate a specific intent to aid and organizations’ 




 For the innocent victims of terrorism, monetary recovery will never fully heal the 
emotional, psychological, and physical wounds that terrorism suddenly and senselessly 
inflicted.278  As Congressman Steven Rothman has noted, the war on terrorism is not a 
typical war – it is fought each day on untypical fronts by soldiers and citizens alike.279  In 
the arena of civil lawsuits, federal statutes 2333 and 1607 provide two valuable weapons 
against the financial sources of terrorism.  In a similar fashion, the joint tort theories of 
civil conspiracy and aiding and abetting liability allow plaintiffs to reach beyond the 
deranged attackers and gunmen themselves to the hidden funders and sources of 
monetary support.  The union of joint tort theory and these statutes, like any new 
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marriage, is filled with a few problems and misunderstandings.  Although, in the end, the 
potential for great things far outweighs the initial difficulties.   
This article has examined both Boim and Ungar, cases that have both struggled to 
reconcile a rather unsettled concept of tort law with statutes seldom interpreted.  As this 
article has demonstrated, Boim and Ungar set a valuable precedent for the application of 
joint tort theory to acts of international terrorism.  Litigants, attorneys, professors, and 
judges are certain to debate, contemplate, and evaluate many of the issues raised by these 
opinions as litigation surrounding the events of 9/11 continues.280  While both of these 
cases reach cogent conclusions, this article has offered an analysis of joint tort theory in 
the context of the pertinent statutes that differs from these opinions in certain contexts.  
This article articulates arguments to, hopefully, maximize the potential for a plaintiff’s 
recovery.  Though the two theories of joint torts and the two statutes discussed have 
certain differences, this article illustrates that secondary liability for terrorist activities 
should focus on the defendant’s general awareness of the illegal activity.  Because of the 
unique requirements of joint torts, this article demonstrates that this general knowledge, 
coupled with the provision of material aid, provides enough connectivity to the tort to 
satisfy the statutory requirements of knowledge, causation, and intent. 
 
 
                                                
280 One group has already sued a Saudi royal family, the Sudanese government, and a Chicago based 
Islamic charity for damages stemming from the 9/11.  Unsurprisingly, the plaintiffs’ attorneys in the case 
cite Boim as a valuable precedent.  Franklin & Cohen, supra n. 59, at 1. 
